A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF NAVAL AIR STATION (NAS) SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) AT FALLON, NV, AND PATUXENT RIVER, MD by Blankenship, John C. & Mann, Nicholas A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2019-12
A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF NAVAL AIR
STATION (NAS) SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR)
AT FALLON, NV, AND PATUXENT RIVER, MD
Blankenship, John C.; Mann, Nicholas A.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64095
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF NAVAL AIR STATION 
(NAS) SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) AT FALLON, NV, 
AND PATUXENT RIVER, MD 
by 
John C. Blankenship and Nicholas A. Mann 
December 2019 
Thesis Advisor: Simona L. Tick 
Co-Advisor: Ryan S. Sullivan 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF NAVAL AIR STATION (NAS) SEARCH 
AND RESCUE (SAR) AT FALLON, NV, AND PATUXENT RIVER, MD
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) John C. Blankenship and Nicholas A. Mann
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)





9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND
ADDRESS(ES) 




11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 Search and rescue (SAR) is a key component in maintaining the necessary safety coverage of flights at 
Naval Air Stations (NAS) across the country. The United States Navy (USN) currently employs the MH-60S 
multi-mission helicopter at all 6 of their SAR locations. Due to projected inventory shortfalls in the future 
and increasing demand on this aircraft to support other operations, we analyze alternatives to provide the 
same SAR capability through other means. In this thesis, we conduct an in-depth cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) on the search and rescue stations located in Fallon, NV, and Patuxent River, MD. Our analysis 
includes all of the costs associated with operating a SAR unit at each of these locations to include 
aircraft, personnel, maintenance, and fuel. We examine whether outsourcing components of SAR is more 
efficient to deliver the required, current, and future SAR capability at these specific locations. In our 
analysis, we find a potential cost savings of $9.8 million over five years by using an all civilian and 
contractor option. Therefore, our recommendation is to use an all civilian and contractor SAR service 
to reduce strain on the MH-60 and reduce costs for the Department of Defense (DoD). 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
personnel, manpower policy, manpower policy issues, acquisitions, maintenance, search and 
rescue, cost benefit analysis, cost efficiency analysis, Navy aviation, naval aviation, analysis 
of alternatives, MH-60S helicopter, commercial outsourcing, special studies, Department of 




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF NAVAL AIR STATION (NAS) SEARCH AND 
RESCUE (SAR) AT FALLON, NV, AND PATUXENT RIVER, MD 
John C. Blankenship 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
BA, Texas State University - San Marcos, 2012 
Nicholas A. Mann 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
BSE, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, 2013 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2019 
Approved by: Simona L. Tick 
Advisor 
Ryan S. Sullivan 
Co-Advisor 
Amilcar A. Menichini 
Academic Associate, Graduate School of Defense Management 
Don E. Summers 
Academic Associate, Graduate School of Defense Management 
Raymond D. Jones 
Academic Associate, Graduate School of Defense Management 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
Search and rescue (SAR) is a key component in maintaining the necessary safety 
coverage of flights at Naval Air Stations (NAS) across the country. The United States 
Navy (USN) currently employs the MH-60S multi-mission helicopter at all six of their 
SAR locations. Due to projected inventory shortfalls in the future and increasing demand 
on this aircraft to support other operations, we analyze alternatives to provide the same 
SAR capability through other means. In this thesis, we conduct an in-depth cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) on the search and rescue stations located in Fallon, NV, and 
Patuxent River, MD. Our analysis includes all of the costs associated with operating a 
SAR unit at each of these locations to include aircraft, personnel, maintenance, and fuel. 
We examine whether outsourcing components of SAR is more efficient to deliver 
the required, current, and future SAR capability at these specific locations. In our 
analysis, we find a potential cost savings of $9.8 million over five years by using 
an all civilian and contractor option. Therefore, our recommendation is to use an all 
civilian and contractor SAR service to reduce strain on the MH-60 and reduce costs 
for the Department of Defense (DoD). 
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The United States Navy (USN) employs a highly versatile helicopter—the MH-60S 
Seahawk (multi-mission helicopter, 60S variant)—to conduct search and rescue (SAR) 
operations for six Naval Air Station (NAS) detachments. These detachments are 
geographically separated at critical locations across the continental United States. Due to a 
current National Security Strategy that stresses higher operational tempo in the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet area of operations (AOR), expectations of continued increasing demand for the MH-
60S is of concern within the next several years. The Navy anticipates potential inventory 
shortfalls for the MH-60S as early as FY2025 (CDR Aaron Taylor, personal 
communication, June 2019). Navy leadership is investigating options and desires research 
into phasing plans to maintain NAS SAR capability while mitigating these projected 
inventory shortfalls and improving mission capability rates for the MH-60S. Among these 
options are avenues for adopting contracted SAR services as well as procuring commercial 
off the shelf (COTS) aircraft that are able to meet or exceed the capabilities of the Seahawk 
(CDR Aaron Taylor, personal communication, June 2019). 
This research is a continuation of projects intended to support Naval leadership and 
decision makers by providing an in-depth analysis of several courses of action (COA) that 
meet the previous requirements and are in line with the National Search and rescue plan. 
Our evaluation follows the research efforts documented in A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Navy 
Station Search and Rescue (SAR) Located in Key West, FL, and Whidbey Island, WA by 
Bryce L. Christensen and Amanda Sciberras (2019), as well as ongoing research for SAR 
at Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA. Our research presents a new take on the recent SAR 
analysis by focusing data collection on two SAR stations located at NAS Fallon, NV, and 
NAS Patuxent River, MD. We examine whether there are any opportunities to outsource 
components of SAR to generate cost savings at these two locations and to provide viable 
options that will mitigate Navy leadership’s anticipated MH-60S inventory shortfalls in the 
coming years. 
We utilize the traditional nine-step approach to conduct a cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) model, as detailed in Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, and Weimber (2017), similar 
2 
to the guidelines from the Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Federal Programs (OMB Circular A-94) (Office of Management and Budget, 1992). We 
organize and compare all applicable data on the status quo and on feasible alternatives to 
make an informed recommendation. We consider influencing factors in the areas of Naval 
manning, Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions, and financial management in order 
to establish three viable COAs for leadership to consider. We continue with an analysis of 
the three COAs compared to a status quo as we weigh costs and benefits to best determine 
a workable solution. We account for both direct and indirect effects of implementing each 
COA as well as determine the varying impact on stakeholders through a sensitivity 
analysis. It is important to note that a critical step in the CBA process is monetizing all 
associated impacts (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & Weimber, 2017). By performing a 
sensitivity analysis, we expect to provide additional impacts and detailed risks to 
stakeholders if one or more of our COAs are implemented. There are multiple aspects of 
every COA that are unable to be monetized but are equally important to consider when 
evaluating a best course of action. We evaluate these factors based off risk.  
The data and recommendations found in this thesis not only provide viable COAs 
for Navy leadership to consider implementing across all NAS SAR detachments but also 
evaluate the individual aspects of each detachment that increase the complexity of a “one 
size fits all” solution. Our goal is to provide enough supporting evidence to apply a tailored 
approach, if possible. No single solution will be able to capture all of the individual 
capabilities and limitations expected with geographically diverse bases of operations. Our 
research discusses proven industry best practices as well as unconventional ideas and 
displays data that is most beneficial in terms of capability and cost.  
Our primary and secondary research questions are designed to capture the objective 
previously discussed. After thorough analysis of alternatives and examination of our 
sponsor’s objectives, we determined these questions appropriately met the intent of our 
project scope. 
 Our primary research question is: Does phased restructuring yield savings in 
support of a feasible alternative for SAR operations at Patuxent River and Fallon Naval 
Air Stations, from a perspective of personnel and aircraft? 
3 
 Our secondary research question is: Is there an option to maintain or improve SAR 
mission capability while mitigating the Navy’s projected inventory shortfalls for the MH-
60S? 
Our study is organized as follows: We begin with an in-depth discussion of the 
background of NAS SAR services and their relation to the overall National SAR plan. 
Since this thesis is written to provide specific recommendations for two of the six NAS 
SAR locations, we provide detailed discussion and background information for each 
location to include site-specific data gathered from in-person visits to both locations. 
Following background information, readers find in Chapter III a breakdown of the primary 
literature we reviewed and referenced to write this thesis. This information is imperative 
to capture the overall project scope of all NAS SAR locations. Chapter IV discusses our 
methodology, specifically detailing the nine steps of a CBA as found in the U.S. 
government’s Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 
Programs (OMB Circular A-94), as well as from Boardman’s 4th edition of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: Concepts and Practice. In Chapter V we lay out our results to include a 
breakdown of each location’s COAs, and a discussion of our sensitivity analysis, 
assumptions, and recommendations for further research. Chapter VI is our conclusion that 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. U.S. NAVY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
In accordance with the National Search and rescue (SAR) Plan, it is the 
responsibility of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) to provide maritime, and the 
United States Air Force (USAF) to provide overland support for all Continental United 
States (CONUS) SAR operations (Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 2007). The 
National SAR Plan also states the United States Navy (USN) is responsible for owning and 
operating the mission capability for SAR in relation to specific geographically isolated 
Naval Air Stations (NAS). These NAS SAR detachments were “established to provide 
critical life-saving support for tactical air operations in regions were response times via 
other SAR agencies were deemed high risk to aircrew survival” (CDR Aaron Taylor, 
personal communication, June 2019). USN active duty pilots and aircrew at these locations 
fly the 60S variant multi-mission helicopter (MH-60S) to meet individual NAS SAR 
mission requirements.  
There are six geographically separated SAR detachments across the continental 
United States. These detachments are located at NAS Whidbey Island, WA; Fallon, NV; 
Lemoore, CA; China Lake, CA; Patuxent River, MD; and Key West, FL. In accordance 
with a Department of the Navy (DoN) generated memorandum of understanding (MOU), 
Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) has overall responsibility for the 
oversight of these detachments and the execution of their SAR missions in support of the 
national SAR plan (Department of the Navy, 2019). This MOU also states that 
responsibility is shared with Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(COMNAVAIRPAC), Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic (COMNAVAIRLANT), 
and their subordinate commands in order to meet individual NAS SAR requirements. 
While our findings and recommendations within the scope of this project may be applied 
individually to all NAS SAR detachments, our research focuses on two of the six current 
detachments; NAS Patuxent River, MD, and NAS Fallon, NV. The remaining four 
locations are being evaluated as part of a collective effort of NPS students to gain varying 
perspectives and cater to site specific challenges and limitations. It is our intent to provide 
6 
recommendations that have specific implications for our two chosen sites while allowing 
concepts to be adapted and applied to remaining locations.  
B. MH-60S INCREASING OPERATIONAL DEMAND 
The Sikorsky built MH-60S Seahawk helicopter is the workhorse of the Navy’s 
surface fleet. These aircraft have the capability to meet a myriad of Naval mission sets 
including vertical replenishment of surface warfare vessels, special warfare support, and 
airborne mine countermeasures as shown in Figure 1. Due to their versatility as a fleet 
asset, the MH-60S is in high demand to meet Naval mission sets in support of the National 
Security Strategy. Naval leadership estimates the operational demand for the MH-60S will 
steadily increase over the next few years reaching a point where the aircraft total 
requirement exceeds total overall aircraft inventory (CDR Aaron Taylor, personal 
communication, June 2019). It is anticipated that this increased demand will significantly 
stress the mission capability rates for the MH-60S throughout the fleet (CDR Aaron Taylor, 
personal communication, June 2019). 
 
Figure 1. MH-60S conducting vertical replenishment operations, 
demonstrating aircraft versatility. Source: Naval Technology 
(2019). 
The primary intent of this project is to identify potential avenues or COA to relieve 
operational stress and increase mission capability for the U.S. Navy’s multi-mission 
helicopter MH-60S variant. Our focus is to determine the most cost effective COA through 
7 
the utilization of an in-depth CBA taking into account options for restructuring Navy 
manpower/personnel, maintenance, and aircraft. In some cases, we consider options for 
specific changes to these areas while keeping in mind the status quo may have elements 
that remain unchanged. Through extensive research, site visits and literature review, we 
take into account various combinations of aircraft and manning to achieve a balance of 
cost, operational availability, and associated risk for each COA in order to achieve the 
intent of our project. As discussed later in this thesis, each SAR station detachment has its 
own specific challenges that significantly impact the complexity of a “one size fits all” 
solution. These challenges are enhanced by geographical location, terrain, and operational 
requirements. 
C. NAS FALLON, NV, SITE OVERVIEW 
Since 1972, there has been a SAR capability located at NAS Fallon, NV. The SAR 
detachment started out flying the Bell HH-1N and did so until 2009. In 2009 they switched 
from the Bell to the Sikorsky SH-60F, and in 2011 they switched to the aircraft they 
currently fly and maintain, the Sikorsky MH-60S Block I. In 1996, when the TOP GUN 
school along with Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center (NAWDC) was 
moved to NAS Fallon, the primary mission became military Search and rescue for 
NAWDC pilots. Their mission includes providing SAR services for military operations in 
Nevada in addition to parts of eastern California. Their primary focus is on the Fallon range 
training complex (FRTC), which is the area in which NAWDC conducts their training. A 
secondary responsibility for the detachment in Fallon is to provide civilian SAR services 
in Nevada and California, provided it does not interfere with their primary mission of 
providing SAR for the FRTC. 
In order to provide these services to both the military and the civilian sector, the 
MH-60S must have a crew to fly and operate the aircraft. This crew consists of a SAR 
Mission Commander, Helicopter Second Pilot, Rescue Crew Chief, and a Helicopter Inland 
Rescue Aircrewman (HIRA), at minimum. If one is available, the crew will frequently 
embark a SAR Medical Technician (SMT), who is capable of providing emergency care 
on site (Department of the Navy, 2012). 
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The SAR detachment in Fallon, NV, consists of three MH-60S Block I aircraft, 
which is the oldest MH-60S used by the USN (AWS1 Kurzendoerfer, personal 
communication, June 2019). When NAWDC is conducting a fly day, one of these aircraft 
along with a previously identified crew is on a thirty-minute alert. This means that they 
must be in the building ready to brief within thirty minutes, not that they will be off deck 
in thirty minutes. They do make regular flights during the day to maintain proficiency of 
the pilots and aircrewmen. When flying, they have a self-imposed limit of staying within 
eighty nautical miles (NM) of the airfield. The max range of the aircraft is approximately 
350 NM for a one-way trip, and the airborne time is approximately 3–3.5 hours. They 
support the training flights of FA-18, F-4, MH-60, and E-2. When NAWDC is not flying, 
they still maintain a two-hour alert even on weekends in the event that they get a call for a 
civilian search and rescue, which is usually an injured skier or hiker (AWS1 Kurzendoerfer, 
personal communication, June 2019). 
Fallon, NV, is unlike any other location at which the Navy maintains a SAR 
detachment. The uniqueness of this location provides many challenges to the detachment 
outside of the fact the SAR is difficult in itself. Fallon is geographically isolated more than 
any other SAR unit, being approximately 280NM from the California coast. This isolation 
from fleet concentrations makes it difficult to get replacement parts and personnel in a 
timely manner. The airbase itself sits at four thousand feet above sea level. Combined with 
the extreme temperatures in Nevada, this creates a lot more stress on the aircraft and limits 
its ability to get up into the mountains for certain missions. The temperatures in Fallon can 
range from 10° to 100° Fahrenheit. While they have an advantage of fewer corrosion issues 
due to not being close to the ocean, which is countered by the heat and dust. These factors 
cause engines and compressor blades to wear down more frequently. The climate is not the 
only factor that sets Fallon apart. The topography is also unique concerning Navy SAR. 
Fallon is surrounded by desert along with mountains, cliffs, and canyons. As such, the 
detachment at Fallon conducts a unique mission for Navy SAR personnel, and they refer 
to it as inland SAR. Every other SAR detachment’s primary mission and training center on 
waterborne SAR. In Fallon, the closest water source being Lake Tahoe, the vast majority 
of their rescues take place in the desert, or amongst cliffs and rocks. Due to this unique 
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challenge, the qualification process for both pilots and aircrewmen is different and longer 
than a traditional waterborne SAR qualification. The aircrewmen go through a six-month 
HIRA syllabus, which is only available at NAS Fallon (LCDR Joshua Haggard, personal 
communication, June 2019). This syllabus makes the aircrewmen not only capable of water 
rescues, but experts at Inland SAR as well. The syllabus that they have self-imposed on 
their crewmen slows down the qualification process, but it is considered critical in ensuring 
that the crewmen are properly trained and prepared to conduct Inland SAR. While critical 
to mission success, this training puts a strain on man hours for the detachment because all 
of it is provided by personnel in house. At the Navy SAR schoolhouse, they do not get any 
training for Inland SAR, so the people that arrive in Fallon have to be re-trained. They 
frequently repel onto cliffs and into caves, and that is something that the Navy-wide 
program does not teach.  
The maintenance situation for the SAR detachment in Fallon differs from some 
other stations around the country. They employ a civilian contracted maintenance team, as 
opposed to Navy maintainers. There are many pros and cons associated with employing a 
civilian maintenance team. Many of the maintenance team employed by Zenetex, which is 
the company currently under contract, have been working on the aircraft at NAS Fallon for 
many years (LCDR Joshua Haggard, personal communication, June 2019). Not having the 
constant turnover that the Navy induces provides a lot of subject matter expertise when it 
comes to maintaining the aircraft. This lack of turnover provides stability and knowledge 
and helps ensure that the aircraft are in good condition to conduct the mission. The negative 
aspects of having a contracted maintenance team in Fallon lie in the lack of flexibility of 
the contract itself. Whereas Navy personnel do not get paid overtime, and they can work 
late hours and weekends, the contractors are only required to do what is written into the 
contract. If they do work outside of the contract or work more than the allotted hours, they 
have to obtain permission and often get paid high overtime costs.  
The SAR detachment in Fallon also provides many other benefits to the base and 
local community. Nicknamed the “Longhorns,” they are a positive and visible presence 
around the city. 
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The Manning for SAR at NAS Fallon consists of seven aircrewmen, but only three 
are qualified. They are currently billeted for nine personnel, leaving a gap of two (LCDR 
Joshua Haggard, personal communication, June 2019). All three of the qualified 
aircrewmen have had their orders extended due to manning and qualification shortfalls. 
They are also billeted for four SMTs, but they fall under the hospital on base, and so they 
are only able to borrow them for missions when they are available. They currently have 
nine pilots and are billeted for nine. However, only five are fully qualified to conduct 
operations, and three of them will be transferring soon. LCDR Haggard informed it takes 
approximately one year to qualify an aircrewmen, and approximately eighteen months to 
qualify a pilot in SAR operations at Fallon.  
Many of the personnel attached to SAR Fallon have additional duties placed upon 
them by the base. These duties include Tower watch, Fleet Division Officer, Airfield 
Operations Officer, and Assistant Operations Officer, Command Fitness Leader, and 
Urinalysis Coordinator (AWS1 Kurzendoerfer, personal communication, June 2019). 
These duties take time away from an undermanned unit that they could be using to 
conduct training or achieve new qualifications. Additionally, they do conduct range tours 
for VIPs that visit the base, as well as assistance with the filming of the 2020 Top Gun film. 
The flight hours for SAR at NAS Fallon have been steady for several years, and 
amount to 320 hours per quarter, or 1280 per year (LCDR Joshua Haggard, personal 
communication, June 2019). They use all flight hours that they are allotted. The average 
military rescue has only taken place about once every three years. A military rescue refers 
to a downed aircraft that requires a SAR unit to assist. According to LCDR Haggard, in 
2019 only 6.1 SAR hours were flown on two separate missions, and both were for civilian 
rescues.  
The Contract Field Team (CFT) in place to conduct the necessary maintenance on 
all three helicopters is now Zenetex. They replaced the old team of 4M HR Logistics, LLC, 
but retained all of the same personnel working there. The contractor total as of now is 
thirty-six personnel. 
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D. PATUXENT RIVER (PATUXENT), MD, SITE OVERVIEW 
MH-60S SAR helicopters are maintained by Dyncorp International contractors at 
NAS Patuxent River primarily to provide rescue assistance to Naval Air Warfare Center- 
Aircraft Division (NAWC-AD) commands in support of Research, Development, Testing 
and Evaluation (RDT&E) operations (William Denena, personal communication, June 
2019). Individual DoD components maintain responsibility to provide SAR facilities for 
their own operation, and these facilities may be used for civil needs on a “not to-interfere” 
basis with military missions (Department of the Navy, 2015). NAS Patuxent River provides 
SAR services as available upon request by Norfolk Area Rescue Center (NARC) for SAR 
operations under the provisions of the U.S. National Search and Rescue Supplement which 
details the National SAR Plan (NSP) (Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 2007). 
NAS Patuxent River SAR and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assistance may be 
provided in response to civilian requests on a “not-to-interfere” basis whenever weather, 
crew, and aircraft availability permit (Department of the Navy, 2015). 
NAS Patuxent River is manned with a total of nine pilot officers consisting of two 
senior level (O-5) Commanders and seven Lieutenants. Pilot manning meets the fit/fill 
requirements for full capacity. However, it is a challenge to meet operational needs 
(including maintenance and functional check flight [FCF] requirements) as pilots are pulled 
for base level collateral duties and administrative tasks (LT Joshua Nunn, personal 
communication, June 2019). 
NAS Patuxent River squadron has fourteen enlisted personnel. Five of these are 
pulled from Naval Medical Clinic (NMC) and consist of three SMTs who are in charge of 
in-flight medical care, and two conduct office administrative work and answer phones. 
These five are not financially accounted for in the SAR squadron since they fall under 
NMC funding. The other nine enlisted are air crewmen/rescue swimmers, one of which is 
an administrative chief (E-7) who is the senior enlisted leader for the squadron. NAS 
Patuxent River is billeted for ten air crewmen, two SMTs and one Chief aircrewmen (LT 
Joshua Nunn, personal communication, June 2019). This emphasized the heavy manning 
requirements for the Navy to meet the SAR mission need. U.S. Navy’s mission manning 
requirements dictate that for every SAR mission one pilot, one crew chief, one rescue 
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swimmer and one SMT are required to be onboard the aircraft. When combined with the 
administrative burdens of the squadron, base collateral duty responsibilities, and under 
manning, this requirement severely impacts the squadron’s ability to perform critical 
training, post-maintenance FCF and drastically increases the required number of personnel 
to meet mission requirements. These additional duties directly impact the active duty Navy 
personnel component cost of squadron operations. Pilot required training flight hours 
follow Naval standards (100 hours minimum) twelve of which are night flying hours. NAS 
Patuxent River SAR squadron is allocated 315 annual SAR training hours in order to meet 
readiness, pilot training and currencies as well as crew proficiencies.  
The three SMTs that are pulled from NMC have to maintain rigorous training 
requirements to include proficient qualifications in all required medical courses. Due to 
operational demand for these SMTs and in order to meet mission requirements with 
sufficient manpower taking into account training requirements, NAS Patuxent River 
requires at least two more SMT billets (in addition to the two they are currently billeted for 
but do not have).  
NAS Patuxent River has a current inventory of three MH-60S helicopters 
specifically designated for NAWC, RDT&E SAR operations. Due to maintenance 
restrictions and operational requirements, they have a fourth MH-60S in transit to station 
due to arrive late 2019 (LCDR Gazafy, personal communication, June 2019). Phase 
rotation is the reasoning behind requiring a fourth aircraft. While one aircraft is in phase 
maintenance rotation, a second is scheduled for long term maintenance leaving one “good” 
aircraft available for operations. If this one aircraft were to experience issues and be 
grounded even for short term maintenance, there would be no backup available to fly (Ray 
Taylor, Dyncorp Site Supervisor, personal communication, June 2019). NAS Patuxent 
River is requesting a fourth aircraft to meet the demand for a backup aircraft on the flight 
line available for operations.  
At times throughout this maintenance phase rotation there may be limited pilot 
availability due to base level collateral duties, watch-standing requirements and other 
administrative obligations making it a challenge for contracted maintenance crew to 
conduct essential post maintenance test flights such as FCFs. 
13 
The majority of the MH-60 aircraft that are received at NAS Patuxent River for 
SAR missions are nearing their mid-life flight hour expectancy. These aircraft are typically 
expected to reach an average 10,000-hour life-span and the aircraft received are usually 
approaching 4,000-5,000 hours (Taylor, personal communication, June 2019).  
NAS Patuxent River has been using DYNCORP contractors base-wide for over a 
decade to maintain all of its aircraft. Since the NAS SAR squadron falls under this base 
maintenance contract, Dyncorp conducts all maintenance on the squadron’s MH-60S. 
Research collected from personnel communications (both active duty and contractor) 
during site visits proved a level of difficulty when mixing contracted personnel with active 
duty. Contractors are required to conduct work based on what is written in their contract. 
Working hours are delineated by Dyncorp and strictly adhere to company policy. This 
presents a significant difficulty when syncing with Navy personnel as DoD employees are 
not restricted to defined working hours and are limited by operating maintenance manuals 
and procedures. Though several issues were observed, it was apparent that the system of 
contracted maintenance in an active duty environment was achievable and meets Navy cost 
objectives. These contractors have one job and that is to maintain the squadron/base aircraft 
as seen in Figure 2. Since they are not pulled away for administrative or collateral duties, 
it was clear in several instances that the Navy personnel were the limiting factor. This is 
important to note when assessing required aircraft inventory compared to squadron 
operational load. In the case of NAS Patuxent River where a fourth aircraft is in route and 
the expectation is four aircraft to make two “good” aircraft, the limiting factor becomes 
apparent in the maintenance phasing schedule when personnel are not available. 
Due to the abnormal type of flight operations required for RDT&E specific 
missions, NAS Patuxent River SAR pilots must conduct hover operations for extended 
periods of time which result in higher than average fuel burn rate for MH-60s. 
U.S. Navy pilot and aircrew training and operational capabilities are significantly 
more versatile than that of potential civilian pilots and aircrew. Due to civilian specific 
limitations imposed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other entities, these 
pilots and air crew aren’t able to conduct operations such as night flights involving hoisting 
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and operations over water and are restricted by terrain such as high elevation and ceiling 
limitations.  
The primary mission of NAS Patuxent River SAR is to conduct RDT&E related 
missions for NAWC-AD. Due to the geographical location of Patuxent River base, the 
civilian SAR requirements for maritime and overland are the primary mission of the local 
United States Coast Guard (USCG) and United States Air Force (USAF) stations. Given 
these other available SAR sources, LT Sturgill maintains that NAS Patuxent River rarely 
conducts civilian SAR missions (LT John Sturgill, personal communication, June 2019). 
Maryland State Trooper police force also has a SAR obligation in the local region. While 
their capabilities are limited and they lack an available rescue hoist for maritime recovery, 
they perform a vital role in the MD state SAR mission (LT John Sturgill, personal 
communication, June 2019).  
 
Figure 2. MH-60S disassembled for CFT phase maintenance at NAS 
Patuxent River, MD 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following studies are reviewed to provide a critical description of the 
framework of analysis used in our study. 
A. COST ANALYSIS FOR A DEDICATED SEARCH AND RESCUE 
CAPABILITY FOR COMMANDER STRIKE FIGHTER WING U.S. PACIFIC 
FLEET 
In March of 2009, Russ Biros, Noel Corpus, Cade Hines, and Tinsika Riggs 
completed an EMBA Project Report on Cost Analysis for a dedicated SAR unit for the 
Strike Fighter Wing in Pacific Fleet. Their study identified a need for a SAR unit at the 
Lemoore Naval Air Station in California. They broke down the pros and cons of 
maintaining a dedicated SAR detachment at this location. 
NAS Lemoore provides training grounds for sixteen F/A-18 squadrons as well as 
four Carrier Air Wings. Commander Strike Fighter Wing Pacific (CSFWP) is in charge of 
all of these aircraft in addition to the training they are required to conduct. Issues began to 
arise with the increase in aircraft and training being conducted in and around NAS Lemoore 
(Biros et al., 2009). Aircrewmen primarily used the NAS Lemoore military operating area 
(MOA). However, the increased demand on training areas required the increased use of the 
offshore warning areas on the coast, and the Fort Hunter Liggett airspace (Biros et al., 
2009). They found that with the amount of training conducted over vast amounts of 
airspace, some of which was over water, that there was not adequate coverage to ensure 
the safety of the CSFWP pilots. Using NAS China Lake as an example, the authors initially 
postulated that NAS Lemoore should have a dedicated SAR unit as well to ensure the safety 
of pilots and aircrew conducting training and missions. 
The authors of the Biros et al. study found that NAS Lemoore possessed a dedicated 
SAR unit until 2004, when the unit was cut in order to achieve cost savings. After the cut, 
it was proposed that the detachment be replaced by a commercial SAR provide, which 
never happened. In the interim, coverage was to be provided by the USCG in San 
Francisco. However, the Coast Guard unit commander even commented that if the pilots 
flying out of Lemoore had to eject in one of the over water offshore warning areas, it would 
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be difficult to rescue the pilots in time due to the distance, weather, and water temperature. 
In a 2006 mishap, there was a two-hour delay in getting a SAR unit from San Francisco to 
provide assistance to a downed aircraft near Lemoore. 
After recognition of this problem, Biros et al. determined that they needed to find 
a cost-effective method of returning in-house SAR capability to NAS Lemoore. They 
gathered data on other SAR sites as a comparison to see which model would work best at 
Lemoore. Some of the sites they researched were NAS Whidbey Island, NAS Fallon, and 
NAS China Lake along with a civilian procurement contract. They examined the number 
of pilots, aircrew, and maintenance personnel at each of the existing locations, as well as 
looking at cost per flight hour (CPH) at each location using the MH-60S. They used CPH, 
Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLR) and Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) to 
determine flying costs for each station based on their hours as well as a baseline of 240 
hours of annual flights. 
To determine the costs of providing SAR at NAS Lemoore, Biros et al. assumed 
that they would require two complete crews to cover a sixteen-hour fly day, which included 
ten aircrew and two maintainers, in addition to factoring in civilian salaries and added flight 
hour costs of an additional 240 hours of flying. By doing this, they could determine how 
much more it would cost an existing SAR detachment to augment NAS Lemoore by 
providing SAR at their location. They used the baseline 240 hours for the NAS Lemoore 
detachment idea and determined the costs of all of the possible COAs. 
After calculating the costs of each COA, Biros et al. determined that based on 240 
flight hours at NAS Lemoore that the CPH would be lowest by providing a dedicated SAR 
detachment. This cost was computed to be $7,732 per flight hour, which was almost $2000 
less per flight hour than the next best alternative which was an all contractor model. They 
recognized that one or two aircraft would have to be taken from elsewhere in the fleet. 
Their ultimate recommendation was the implementation of the all contractor SAR model, 
which came out to $9,415 per flight hour, but eliminated quality of life impacts on military 
personnel and future budget cut risks for the SAR detachment. This model would provide 
cost-effective SAR capability at NAS Lemoore while ensuring pilot and aircrew safety in 
the future. 
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B. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MARINE CORPS SEARCH AND RESCUE 
(SAR): A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVES FOR MARINE CORPS AIR 
STATIONS AT CHERRY POINT AND YUMA 
In December of 2013, Clinton Collins and Robert Williamson completed a CBA 
for Marine Corps SAR and SAR alternatives at both Cherry Point, and Yuma. They were 
providing local SAR for the Marine Corps at these locations, as well as SAR for the local 
communities when necessary. Due to the fact that SAR is not a primary mission of the 
Marine Corps, this study aimed to quantify all of the costs associated with SAR, look at 
alternatives for local SAR, and try to determine the best method to reduce costs to the 
Marine Corps. With SAR not being a core competency of the Marine Corps, they analyzed 
the SAR costs over a 10-year horizon in addition to cost savings associated with using a 
contracted service. 
The Marines utilized the HH-46E at the Cherry Point location and the HH-1N at 
the Yuma location to conduct SAR missions (Collins & Williamson, 2013). These aircraft 
along with their pilots, aircrew, and maintainers represented a significant cost to the Marine 
Corps on an annual basis. Their thesis was not a traditional CBA, but more of a Cost-Based 
Analysis in that they did not look at the benefits and focused only on the costs between 
alternatives. They examined the current costs of both SAR operations at Cherry Point and 
Yuma using historical cost data from both sites. They also looked at costs associated with 
aircraft procurement to include future operations and support (O&S) costs. They calculated 
costs of outsourcing the SAR services and compared those with the costs of the current 
makeup as well as aircraft upgrades through procurement. 
The status quo for Collins and Williamson was not a viable option to pursue as both 
aircraft in service were at or near the end of their useful life. Their first viable COA was 
the HH-1Y upgrade, which would replace the HH-46E and HH-1N SAR helicopters in use 
at the time. This COA would take into account all of the procurement, upgrade, and O&S 
costs associated with converting both units to fly the HH-1Y. Their other COA was the 
commercial outsourcing of all necessary SAR services at both locations. They focused on 
commercial SAR alternatives that would provide at least the same level of capability as the 
current SAR units. The average cost of SAR for the Marine Corps during the time period 
18 
of 2003–2012 based on the data they gathered was $21,019,412, using the status quo. In 
this case COA 1 would involve the procurement of six HH-1Y helicopters and would 
transition all SAR operations to using these aircraft. They used two different estimates to 
determine the cost of these six aircraft to the Marine Corps. The program office estimate 
at PMA-276 was $28,961,000 per aircraft or $173,767,000 in total while the estimate they 
computed $29,284,000 per aircraft and $175,705,000 in total. They estimated the UH-1Y 
(shown in Figure 3) to HH-1N conversion cost to be $82,392,000 for six aircraft. Together, 
the total procurement cost estimate for six HH-1Y was $258,098,280, or $43,016,380 per 
aircraft. They also determined an estimated O&S cost over ten years to be $180,752,982 
for the six aircraft. Additionally, their mid-range estimate for ten years to cover both 
locations was $266,785,742 in FY2014$. They compared these numbers against data 
obtained from existing contracted SAR services such as air ambulance services and SAR 
services provided by Bristow Group Inc. to the United Kingdom. Comparing their cost data 
with that of the commercial alternative they determined that SAR costs per year using the 
HH-1Y would be approximately $26 million per year and that contracted SAR services 
could be provided for $12 million per year. 
 
Figure 3. UH-1Y photo. Source: Collins and Williamson (2013). 
After analyzing the results of their 2013 study, the authors determined that the 
Marine Corps could find significant cost savings if they used a contracted SAR service 
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while still maintaining or exceeding the minimum SAR capabilities necessary. They 
recommended that the Marine Corps consider the use of outsourcing the SAR contracts at 
both Cherry Point and Yuma. 
C. A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF NAVY STATION SEARCH AND 
RESCUE (SAR) LOCATED IN KEY WEST, FL, AND WHIDBEY ISLAND, 
WA 
In June of 2019, Bryce L. Christensen and Amanda Sciberras completed their CBA 
study for SAR stations in Key West and Whidbey Island. Their study examined the special 
features of conducting SAR at each of these Naval Air Stations and all of the costs 
associated to determine if there were any opportunities for savings by making a change at 
one or both locations. They focused on all aspects of the stations and, in particular, on the 
costs associated with maintenance. The SAR units at these two sites employ an active duty 
maintenance component as opposed to a CFT maintenance model that is used at other sites 
including Fallon and Patuxent River. Their research was designed to determine if CFT 
maintenance was indeed a cheaper alternative than an active duty maintenance team and if 
there was any other way to find cost savings while also relieving stress on the MH-60S 
platform. 
Christensen and Sciberras examined fleet inventory of the MH-60S platform and 
the cost associated to maintain that aircraft, as well as personnel, operational, fuel and 
maintenance costs. They conducted site visits to both NAS Whidbey Island and NAS Key 
West to speak with the SAR units there and obtain as much cost data as possible. Their 
goal was to determine if there were cost effective alternatives to the status quo SAR make-
ups at their specific sites and to determine if outsourcing any SAR services would be a 
viable option to save money. Both of their sites used the MH-60S helicopter (shown in 
Figure 4) to conduct the SAR mission. Additionally, both of their sites had an active duty 
military maintenance team, pilots, and air crew. 
In their 2019 study, Christensen and Sciberras elected to use a cost-benefit analysis 
approach for their research project, and in this CBA framework they determined three 
alternative courses of action they compared with the status quo. COA 1 was an active duty 
SAR crew with a CFT for maintenance. COA 2 was an active duty SAR crew, CFT 
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maintenance, and replacing the MH-60S with a COTS aircraft. COA 3 was to remove the 
active duty component entirely and use an all contracted SAR service with a civilian 
aircraft. 
 
Figure 4. MH-60S SAR aircraft during training flight near NAS Key West. 
Source: Christensen and Sciberras (2019). 
Christensen and Sciberras built a cost model with the data they obtained. They used 
the active duty personnel at each station, along with all the pay and benefits they were 
entitled to in order to determine the personnel costs. For aircraft costs, they were able to 
compare the costs of commercial aircraft, specifically the Sikorsky S-92 and the Bell 214B, 
against the yearly costs of the MH-60. They used the fuel costs obtained from each site 
which was a component of the flying hours and the cost of JP-5. Facility costs were 
obtained from the Whidbey Island site and were assumed to be a constant at both sites. 
Lastly, they used a PMA-226 study on SAR contracts, using the Bell 214B to determine 
what an all contract SAR service would cost. 
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This study compiled all of the authors’ data into tables, and then compared the costs 
of each COA against the status quo. Their research determined that all three of their COAs 
would provide cost savings to the DoD at both locations. They found that at NAS Whidbey 
Island they would save $2.9M per year and $4.1M per year at NAS Key West if they 
implemented a Contract Field Team for maintenance. A CFT maintenance team was 
already in use at Fallon, Patuxent River, and Lemoore so this was a feasible COA. The 
large decrease in cost was due to the decrease in active duty personnel and all of the 
associated costs they come with. Their all-contract SAR model showed a cost savings of 
$5.8M at Whidbey Island and $6.7M at Key West. While this was the most cost effective 
COA based on their data, they determined it was not the best one due to unintended 
consequences and trade-offs associated with the complete removal of the active duty 
component at these sites. 
Similar to the Christensen and Sciberras (2019) study, we evaluate alternatives for 
conducting SAR services at various NAS locations. However, in this study we examine the 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
The following methodology was primarily derived from Boardman et al., Cost-
Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 4th edition. We used this model and the nine-step 
CBA process to provide recommendations on COAs as well as answer our primary and 
secondary questions.  
A. USING A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS MODEL  
The intent of our research project is to identify the associated costs and potential 
savings (benefits) of feasible alternatives for SAR program operations at NAS Fallon and 
NAS Patuxent River. Our goal is to monetize the benefits associated with each site and 
determine if those benefits outweigh the costs of maintaining a SAR detachment on site or 
if there are variations of restructuring that allow for are more efficient way to conduct SAR 
operations. According to Boardman et al. (2017, p. 2), “The broad purpose of [a] CBA is 
to help social decision making and to make it more rational. More specifically, the 
objective is to have more efficient allocation of society’s resources.” 
The OMB Circular A-94 provides general guidance on the use of CBA stating 
“Benefit-cost analysis is recommended as the technique to use in a formal economic 
analysis of government programs or projects” (Office of Management and Budget, 1992, 
p. 4). In both the OMB A-94 and Boardman we are able to derive the nine-step CBA 
process as follows: 
1. Step 1: Specify Analysis of Alternatives 
In this step, we analyze each of our determined COAs (projects) and compare them 
against the status quo.  
Status Quo: Navy pilots and enlisted aircrewmen fly the MH-60S to complete 
station SAR missions. All maintenance is conducted by civilian contractors.  
We evaluated three COAs against the status quo. 
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a. COA 1 
Maintain personnel and CFT maintenance contract status quo and purchase the 
Sikorsky S-92 helicopter as the COTS aircraft to replace the MH-60S.  
b. COA 2 
Maintain personnel and CFT maintenance status quo and purchase the Bell-214B 
helicopter as the COTS aircraft to replace the MH-60S.  
c. COA 3 
Fully contractor-run program. Government will submit request for bid on 
pilot/aircrewmen service contract and keep existing contractor maintenance (if applicable). 
Government will procure COTS aircraft of choice (S-92 or Bell-214B) based on available 
funding.  
2. Step 2: Determine Who Has Standing 
The DoD, specifically the U.S. Navy and civilian government contractors currently 
performing maintenance at these two sites are our primary stakeholders. Additionally, U.S. 
taxpayers have significant standing since not only is the DoD budget is funded by them, 
but in certain circumstances NAS SAR provides critical lifesaving services to civilians. For 
this reason, we determined our CBA must take a national approach.  
3. Step 3: Identify the Impacts 
Following are several examples of direct and indirect benefits to maintaining the 
status quo or implementing a policy change. 
a. Direct Benefits (Policy Change) 
• Increased fleet-wide Mission Capability rates for MH-60S aircraft 
• Reduction of overall program costs (with COA 3 implementation)  
b. Indirect Benefits (Policy Change) 
• Minimized personnel turnover rates 
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• Reduction in conflict of interest between contractor and active duty Navy 
personnel resulting in a streamlined coordination of effort  
c. Direct Benefits (Status Quo) 
• Continuation of body of knowledge (continue CFT maintenance and 
active duty pilots and aircrewmen) 
d. Indirect Benefits (Status Quo) 
• Civilian community “good faith” 
• Loss of knowledge within Navy pilots and aircrewmen 
e. Direct Costs (Policy Change) 
• Contract cost negotiations due to FAR requirements. Associated costs for 
contract acquisitions process  
• Up-front aircraft procurement 
f. Indirect Costs (Policy Change) 
• Establishment of commercial aircraft supply chain for spare parts and 
associated training material 
• Increased training cost for pilots and maintenance crew for commercially 
procured aircraft 
g. Direct Costs (Status quo) 
• MH-60S aircraft inventory shortfalls and reduced availability of MH-60S 
helicopters to perform other missions for the U.S. Navy 
h. Indirect Costs (Status quo) 
• Long-term aircraft capability reduction without advance of airframe  
26 
4. Step 4: Predict the Impacts Over the Life of the Project 
The scope of our analysis stretches the span of five years into FY 2023. This project 
life-span is expected to cover the time period prior to expected inventory shortfalls in FY 
2025. Our calculated NPV is expected to project the impacts of an alternate COA 
implementation before a period of extremis. Should a particular COA be implemented 
based on our recommendations, the life of the project can be extended and impacts re-
calculated to show long-term effects. We utilized a five-year project life in order to capture 
significant up-front costs that may prove beneficial during the initial decision-making 
process. As time progresses, the realized benefits will increase with expected increases in 
MH-60S mission capability rates while COTS aircraft procurement will be realized as sunk 
costs.  
5. Step 5: Monetize the Impacts 
Though we are not able to monetize every single impact involved in our analysis, 
we have considered variations within our sensitivity analysis, and made every effort to 
ensure that when unable to monetize, we effectively quantified each aspect of cost and 
benefit. When possible, we identified monetized values for both direct and indirect impacts 
and ensured that we recognized both intangible and tangible benefits and costs (Office of 
Management and Budget, 1992).  
6. Step 6: Apply a Discount Rate  
In order to conduct a NPV for each COA to encompass our expected five-year 
program life, we had to utilize an appropriate discount factor for every cost and benefit 
beyond our base year of 2018. This allowed us to estimate monetized value expected in the 
later years of program implementation. For this discount factor, we utilized a discount rate 
of 7% for each year beyond 2018 based on OMB Circular A-94, Appendix C. We used a 
nominal interest rate following our inflated values for each aspect of our COAs. OMB 
Circular A-94, Appendix A defines nominal discount rate as “An interest rate that is not 
adjusted to remove the effects of actual or expected inflation” (Office of Management and 
Budget, 1992, p. 19). Our specific inflation rates were individualized for each aspect of our 
COAs and were applied to personnel, operations, fuel, and aircraft costs separately.  
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7. Step 7: Net Present Value 
We utilize NPV calculations in order to determine the economic feasibility of our 
prospective COAs. The OMB Circular A-94 discusses how to compute NPV and related 
outcome measures:  
Net present value is computed by assigning monetary values to benefits and 
costs, discounting future benefits and costs using an appropriate discount 
rate, and subtracting the sum total of discounted costs from the sum total of 
discounted benefits. Discounting benefits and costs transforms gains and 
losses occurring in different time periods to a common unit of measurement. 
(Office of Management and Budget, 1992, p. 4) 
8. Step 8: Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to capture that variability of impacts in addition to calculated monetary 
values we conducted a thorough sensitivity analysis in several critical areas of concern. 
OMB Circular A-94 provides further guidance on conducting sensitivity analysis stating: 
Major assumptions should be varied and net present value and other 
outcomes recomputed to determine how sensitive outcomes are to changes 
in the assumptions. The assumptions that deserve the most attention will 
depend on the dominant benefit and cost elements and the areas of greatest 
uncertainty of the program being analyzed. (Office of Management and 
Budget, 1992, p. 11) 
The results of our sensitivity analysis are discussed later in this thesis.  
9. Step 9: Recommendation 
One of our primary goals in this thesis is to determine an effective solution that will 
allow a continuation of NAS SAR services while relieving operational stress and increasing 
mission capability rates of the MH-60S aircraft. While our analysis covers several COAs 
that meet this goal, it is assumed that there may be significant up-front costs for 
procurement and implementation of a new aircraft into the Navy SAR fleet. We intend to 
make a recommendation that is consistent with the goals of our sponsor and is generally 
cost effective to all stakeholders. Upon presentation of our calculations, supporting data, 
and sensitivity analysis, we expect to provide one or more recommendations that can be 
implemented to meet these requirements. It is understood that with these assumptions in 
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mind and up-front costs considered, our recommendation may not be consistent with the 
highest Net Present Value (NPV) calculated. We assume that all NPV calculations are 
estimated values and that our sensitivity analysis will assist in determining which 
alternative is best suited, even if that COA is not the largest expected NPV (Boardman, 






This chapter discusses the results that were determined for each COA and provide 
details of our sensitivity analysis, relevant research, and expected outcomes.  
A. FALLON, NV 
For NAS Fallon, NV, we assessed the following three COAs against the status quo:  
1. COA 1 
For this COA we used the Sikorsky S-92 helicopter as the commercial option to 
meet aircraft requirements. We determined for the Fallon location there would be a 
preliminary cost of $1,738,335 for the first year as shown in Table 1. We conducted a NPV 
over five-year expected project life and determined that COA 1 would result in a total cost 
of $9,273,313 as shown in Table 2.  
Table 1. COA 1 vs. status quo for NAS Fallon 
 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix B.  
30 
Table 2. COA 1—table of net present values for NAS Fallon 
 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix B. 
 
2. COA 2 
For this COA we inserted the Bell 214B as the commercial aircraft option. We 
determined for the Fallon location there would be a preliminary cost of $1,166,431 for the 
first year as shown in Table 3. Our five-year NPV resulted in a cost of $6,225,448 as shown 
in Table 4.  
Table 3. COA 2 vs. status quo for NAS Fallon 
 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix B. 
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Table 4. COA 2—table of net present values for NAS Fallon 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix B. 
3. COA 3
For this COA we utilized the Bell214B as the commercial aircraft procurement 
option while simulating a civilian contract model. We determined that there would be a 
preliminary cost savings of $500,890 for the first year for the Fallon location as shown in 
Table 5. Our five-year NPV calculation resulted in a cost savings of $2,826,455 as shown 
in Table 6.  
Table 5. COA 3 vs. status quo for NAS Fallon 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix B. 
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Table 6. COA 3—table of net present values for NAS Fallon 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix B. 
B. PATUXENT RIVER, MD
For NAS Patuxent River, MD we assessed the following three COAs against the
status quo. 
1. COA 1
Implementing the same COA 1 model with the S-92 aircraft, we found a 
preliminary cost of $933,833 for the first year as shown in Table 7. Our five-year NPV 
resulted in a total cost of $4,978,808 as shown in Table 8. Overall, we found this would 
not be a cost efficient COA for aircraft procurement; however, the capabilities of the S-92 
are greatly superior to the MH-60. If aircraft capability is considered the most important 
option and funding is available, we believe the S-92 would be more than sufficient to meet 
the SAR mission need. 
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Table 7. COA 1 vs. status quo for NAS Patuxent River 
 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix C. 
Table 8. COA 1—table of net present values for NAS Patuxent River 
 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix C. 
 
2. COA 2 
Implementing the COA 2 model with the Bell-214 aircraft, we found a preliminary 
cost of $610,043 for the first year as shown in Table 9. Our five-year NPV resulted in a 
total cost of $3,254,639 as shown in Table 10. We determined this would be the most cost 
efficient COA for replacing the MH-60S if leadership was intent on keeping military pilots 
and aircrew. 
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Table 9. COA 2 vs. status quo for NAS Patuxent River 
 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix C. 
Table 10. COA 2—table of net present values for NAS Patuxent River 
 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix C. 
 
3. COA 3 
Implementing the COA 3 model with full contracted services and the Bell-214 
aircraft, we found a preliminary savings of $1,300,051 for the first year as shown in Table 
11. Our five-year NPV resulted in a cost savings of $7,091,197 as shown in Table 12. For 
a five-year projection, this model resulted in the most cost-effective option. 
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Table 11. COA 3 vs. status quo for NAS Patuxent River 
 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix C. 
Table 12. COA 3—table of net present values for NAS Patuxent River 
 
Calculations based on model and sources described in Appendix C. 
 
C. DISCUSSION  
1. Sensitivity Analysis 
After monetizing all associated costs and benefits we conducted a sensitivity 
analysis in several areas that we believe to be the most influential for our recommendations. 
A sensitivity analysis is an important piece of the CBA as it accounts for possible 
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variability within our assumptions. Boardman emphasizes the use of a sensitivity analysis 
and cautions: 
There are practical limits to the amount of sensitivity analysis that is 
feasible. Potentially, every assumption in a CBA can be varied. In practice, 
one has to use judgement and focus on the most important assumptions. 
Although this can mean that CBA is vulnerable to the biases of the analyst, 
carefully thought-out scenarios are usually more informative than a 
mindless varying of assumptions. (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & 
Weimber, 2017, p. 15) 
We believe that after appropriately monetizing our predicted impact, the following 
areas were of most concern for variation and therefore required a thorough sensitivity 
analysis to account for these possible fluctuations.  
a. Community Relations  
The impact on the community is difficult to monetize but has to be acknowledged. 
The local footprint provided by both the Fallon and Patuxent River SAR detachments is 
resoundingly positive. The removal of these detachments, which is a possibility if COA 3 
is selected, would have a negative impact on the local communities. The intangible benefits 
provided by these sites would go away. Some of these benefits include a good public image, 
community service, volunteer work, and other events that these personnel regularly 
participate in. The loss of these would have a negative impact on community relations. 
b. Fuel Price Fluctuations  
We used the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimate for percentage 
increase or decrease of fuel prices over the next five years. We chose to use their expected 
mid-level change from year to year while recognizing that this change could be higher or 
lower than the expected change. If the change per year is lower than expected, then each 
COA we examined would result in additional cost savings and/or be cheaper than they 
would have been with the expected fuel cost change. If the change is higher than expected, 
each COA would cost more than expected. Additionally, with the burn rates of the aircraft 
we examined being as follows: the Sikorsky S-92; 205 Gallons Per Hour (GPH), the Bell 
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214B; 160 GPH, the MH-60S; 129 GPH (Conklin and de Decker, 2019) significantly 
higher cost in fuel prices may make COAs involving commercial aircraft less viable.  
c. Discount Factor 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94 and most economics 
literature traditionally recommends using a 7% discount rate when dealing with 
government programs. According to the memo to update OMB Circular A-94 released in 
2018, they recommend using a discount rate that is updated yearly and based on the length 
of the program. In the case of this thesis, we examined a five-year program life. According 
to the A-94 memo update we could potentially use a 3.3% discount rate for a five-year 
program as opposed to the 7% which is regarded as the standard for military programs. 
This change in discount rate would result in an overall increase on total costs or savings at 
the end of five years. Using this lower discount factor instead of the traditional 7% will 
show that the overall costs for COAs 1 and 2 will increase while the overall savings for 
COA 3 will increase. A discount factor of 3.3% would make COA 3 an even more viable 
solution, while making COAs 1 and 2 potentially too costly to implement. 
2. Assumptions 
In order to provide supplemental information to our CBA process, this section 
details the additional considerations implemented and the assumptions made for each 
COA. 
a. Active Duty Personnel 
We used 2018 base pay and basic allowance for housing (BAH) rates specific to 
each location at Fallon and Patuxent River to determine active duty personnel costs. We 
multiplied the rates from the Military Benefits website by the number of personnel at each 
rank for each location. We then increased this personnel cost per year, assuming the same 
amount of manning at each location, by 2.5% which is the delineated cost increase for 
personnel used in the Joint Inflation Calculator (JIC) (Naval Center for Cost Analysis, 
2019). 
38 
b. Aircraft Costs 
We used the aircraft costs per year given to us by PMA 226, which provided the 
yearly cost of operating an MH-60R. Due to the relative similarity of airframe between the 
MH-60R and MH-60S, we believe this cost data was sufficient in estimating direct costs 
impacts for this thesis. We used the 2.0% increase per year from the Operations and 
Support cost from the JIC (Naval Center for Cost Analysis, 2019). 
c. Training  
We assumed that training costs would be embedded into the personnel and contract 
costs and therefore did not separate out specific training costs for active duty personnel or 
contracted pilots and aircrewmen.  
d. Maintenance and Fuel 
We assumed that the maintenance costs associated with the aircraft would be 
covered by the CFT maintenance contract at each location. For fuel costs, we took the full 
FY 2018 fuel costs at each location, and using the amount of fuel burned in that year 
determined the cost per gallon for each location. To determine future fuel costs we used 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) predictive model on the future costs of 
jet fuel prices as seen in Figure 5. We applied the predicted percent increase or decrease to 
our FY 2018 fuel cost to approximate future fuel prices. We also assumed a 2.0% increase 
per year in costs associated with Operations and Support based in the JIC (Naval Center 




Jet fuel depicting reference case estimate used in our calculations. Source: U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (2019). 
Figure 5. Real petroleum prices, 2018 
e. Facilities 
Our facility costs were taken from a previous study conducted at NAS Whidbey 
Island (Christensen & Sciberras, 2019). The cost would sustain the facility, including 
hanger bays, maintenance and office space, for the entire year. Since we were unable to 
obtain facility costs for either of our locations, and NAS Whidbey Island has similar 
manning and number of aircraft, we used these facility costs as part of our calculations. We 
also used the 2.0% increase per year from the Operations and Support cost from the JIC. 
f. Active Duty Fully Burdened Cost 
We referenced the RAND study (Dahlman, 2007) to capture a fully burdened cost 
of a military person. This study identifies all of the additional costs for military personnel 
to include healthcare, housing, retirement, commissary and other benefits. We then applied 
the 2.5% increase per year from the Manpower Costs in the JIC. 
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3. Recommendations for Further Research  
In our analysis, we examined all of the costs associated with operating a Naval SAR 
unit for one calendar year. We then determined what the present value, and net present 
value would be over the course of five years based on the one years’ worth of data we were 
able to obtain. Our research examined the following: 
• Flight hours for military versus civilian SAR 
• Collateral Duties assigned to SAR personnel 
• Difficulties with terrain and weather 
• Aircraft capabilities and limitations 
• Qualification and training requirements  
• Unintended consequences, costs, and benefits 
In further research, we would like to examine more in-depth costs regarding 
specific parts, as well as having a more robust database for historical data to make future 
predictions more accurate. We were also unable to obtain data on an all-in-one contracted 
service where a third-party company provides all services, as well as their own aircraft. We 
do believe that this could be a viable option, as there are companies such as Bristow and 
Priority One that can offer this type of service. If the DoD could obtain competitive bids 
for a such a contract, we believe that they could save additional money through this 
“bundle” package. In 2013 The United Kingdom conducted a study of outsourcing all 
military SAR to contractors. They were met with extreme resistance from the local 
population, claiming that commercial entities could not maintain the same level of service 
and expertise as the military. As of 2013, Bristow Helicopters Limited maintains all SAR 
operations for the United Kingdom (Christensen & Sciberras, 2019). 
Other entities such as the Forestry Service and National Parks conduct their own 
SAR operations as well. They have models in place already, in order to conduct SAR 
missions in a cost-effective manner. The demand placed on these units is significantly 
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lower however, there is certainly something to be learned or gained by examining their 
operations. 
It is incredibly important to solve the issue of what SAR operations at Naval Air 
Stations will look at in the future. There are many options in previous studies, as well as 
options presented here that are viable. According to the Center for Naval Analysis, the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) predicted that the MH-60S will be 
depleted for SAR use by fiscal year (FY) 2025. The OPNAV long-term recommendation 
was to use a contract air service (CAS) to provide all SAR services (Christensen & 
Sciberras, 2019). Based on this information as well as the research we conducted, it is 
imperative to find a long-term solution to maintain the necessary SAR services at all Naval 
Air Stations. 
We were unable to take into account all of the unintended consequences in our 
research. If SAR were to be outsourced, then the Navy would be able to re-assign the MH-
60s to other detachments, which is a huge benefit. However, we did not factor in what 
would become of Navy personnel attached to the SAR units. They would have to be 
relocated, as these billets would go away. We did consider that these billets as they stand 
now, count as a shore duty for most pilots and aircrewman. Being able to still fly while on 
shore duty is a benefit to the pilots, aircrewman, and the Navy as a whole because they can 
maintain their proficiency while on shore duty, instead of sitting behind a desk or doing 
something unrelated to flying aircraft. The manning implications of this study, were 
considered, but not quantified. Future studies should examine the effects of losing these 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
43 
VI. CONCLUSION  
In this study we used a cost-benefit analysis approach to examine cost-saving 
alternatives for conducting SAR operations at Fallon, NV and Patuxent River, MD that 
might also release pressure on the MH-60S multi-mission helicopter used for SAR. 
A. FINDINGS FOR PRIMARY QUESTION  
Does phased restructuring yield savings in support of a feasible alternative for 
SAR operations at Patuxent River and Fallon Naval Air Stations from a perspective 
of personnel and aircraft? 
Our data showed several variations of restructuring through implementation of 
different COAs. We observed significant cost savings from adopting an all contractor SAR 
program and eliminating excess personnel costs from the active duty component (COA 3). 
As anticipated, each of our considered COAs demonstrated the ability to relieve fleet 
operational stress on the MH-60S and in turn increase mission capability rates through 
procurement of a commercial aircraft that meets SAR capability requirements. COAs 1 and 
2 examined keeping the active duty personnel component in place and purchasing a new 
airframe (either the S-92 or Bell-214B). These COAs obviously come with high up-front 
procurement costs but meet the objective of freeing up MH-60S for fleet use. Our analysis 
showed that a phased procurement will reduce this cost over the expected life of the 
program. Phased restructuring will allow the Navy to implement training and standard 
operating procedures to meet the requirements of a new aircraft assuming the active duty 
Navy personnel component remains in place. With an adoption of COA 3 this phased 
restructuring plan can be more streamlined. We identified potential for further costs savings 
during our research from the utilization of a “bundled” contract for SAR services. For 
example, a plan similar to COA 3 that uses a contractor who can provide all SAR services 
and materials to include aircraft, maintenance, pilots and aircrew. This plan would 
eliminate the steep up-front procurement costs for the Navy as well as reduce or eliminate 
the training factor. This “all-inclusive” SAR structure was adopted by the British 
Government in 2013 when they negotiated a contract with Bristow Helicopters Limited to 
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cover SAR for the domestic UK (Christenson and Sciberras, 2019). Bristow is one of many 
companies worldwide that provide SAR services for both civilians and government 
entities. Due to time restrictions, we did not explore this option further; however, we 
recommend further research into this area. 
After analyzing the three potential COAs compared to the status quo, the most cost-
efficient method to deliver SAR capability at Fallon and Patuxent River is COA 3 – an all 
contractor-run service. While all three COAs increase mission capability rates for the MH-
60 by replacing them with commercial aircraft, this COA was determined to be the most 
cost-effective option due to the significant reduction in active duty Navy personnel costs.  
Assuming a NAS SAR station-wide solution (encompassing all six locations), we 
recommend adopting COA 2 and utilizing the Bell 214B as the commercial aircraft 
procurement option. This COA increases mission capability rates for the MH-60 and is less 
costly than COA 1. Due to the nature of SAR at NAS Lemoore, where most of the mission 
requirements are over water or conducted at night, COA 3 is not a viable solution. 
Based on the data we analyzed in our CBA, our final recommendation is to adopt a 
variation of COAs depending on site location and individual NAS requirements and 
limitations. For Fallon and Patuxent River, COA 3 would yield significant cost savings 
while ensuring mission capability rates of the MH-60S. For these locations, a full-
contractor run program would meet all requirements. COA 3 may not bet feasible for every 
location due to requirements that civilian pilots may not be able to meet in support of NAS 
and civilian missions based on a variation of capabilities and limitations.  
B. FINDINGS FOR SECONDARY QUESTION  
Is there an option to maintain or improve SAR mission capability while 
mitigating Navy’s projected inventory shortfalls for the MH-60S?  
Our research determined there are multiple ways to mitigate projected inventory 
shortfalls while maintaining current SAR capability. While procurement of similar aircraft 
such as the S-92 and Bell-214B carry an up-front cost, we believe this to be a viable option 
for the Navy to pursue if implementing a phased restructuring plan as described above. The 
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MH-60S Block I airframes that are made available to these SAR detachments are nearing 
the end of their service life and require extensive maintenance periods, parts allocation, 
time, and manpower to keep serviceable. For this reason, many detachments require 
multiple aircraft to make the minimum required number available for alert status 
operations. In the case of NAS Patuxent River, they require four aircraft to make two; and 
for NAS Fallon, they require three aircraft to make two. There is potential to reduce the 
required number of aircraft for each NAS SAR detachment if these older aircraft are cycled 
out prior to their Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) life and used for parts 
cannibalization while more capable aircraft are delivered for SAR use. We realized during 
our research that this may be a potential area for savings and recommend further research 
into this COA.  
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APPENDIX A. GENERAL INFORMATION  
This appendix contains generalized information used in calculations for both NAS 
Fallon, NV, and NAS Patuxent River, MD. The information contained herein aided in 
deriving cost and benefits data specific to each location and was part of our overall 
recommendations. 
Table 13. Active duty pay chart 2018. Source: Military Benefits (2019b). 
 
This table depicts pay rates by rank and service time for active duty Navy members in base year 
2018. Data was used to determine active duty personnel costs for COA calculations.  
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Table 14. RAND study—cost of a military person, current compensation 
costs. Adapted from Dahlman (2007). 
 
The data presented in this study aided in the calculations for active duty fully burdened 
compensation costs. The study accounts for various factors not considered in standard Navy pay 
calculations and helped determined a more accurate reflection of personnel costs.  
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Table 15. RAND study—cost of a military person, deferred compensation 
costs. Adapted from Dahlman (2007). 
 
The data presented in this study aided in the calculations for active duty fully burdened 
compensation costs. The study accounts for various factors not considered in standard Navy pay 




Table 16. RAND study—cost of a military person, non-compensation costs. 
Adapted from Dahlman (2007). 
 
The data presented in this study aided in the calculations for active duty fully burdened 
compensation costs. The study accounts for various factors not considered in standard Navy pay 
calculations and helped determined a more accurate reflection of personnel costs.  
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Table 17. Basic allowance rates for active duty personnel 
Patuxent River, MD (with and without dependents). Source: 
Military Benefits (2019a) 
 
Data was sourced to determine additional costs for active duty Navy personnel, specifically basic 
allowance for housing rates based on duty location Patuxent River, MD.  
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Table 18. Basic allowance rates for active duty personnel, Fallon, NV (with 
and without dependents). Source: Military Benefits (2019a). 
 
Data was sourced to determine additional costs for active duty Navy personnel, specifically basic 
allowance for housing rates based on duty location Fallon, NV.   
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Table 19. Flight cost definitions 
 
Adapted from CDR Aaron Taylor, N98 (personal communication, 2019) and Christensen and 
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APPENDIX B. NAS FALLON, NV 
The information contained in this appendix was used for calculations that assisted 
in the development of our COAs for NAS Fallon, NV.  
Table 20. General information for NAS Fallon 
 
 
Snapshot of general information used in calculations for NAS Fallon, NV. These values represent 
data that was used in the determination of individual COA costs for this site location as well as 
fuel burn rates determined for COTs aircraft.  This table is a summary of calculations derived in 
Appendix B.
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Table 21. COA breakdown for base year 2018 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2018 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status 
quo. COA 1 of this table was used in Table 1, 3 and 5 of chapter V. Results. 
Table 22. COA breakdown for base year 2019 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2019 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status 
quo.  
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Table 23. COA breakdown for base year 2020 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2020 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status 
quo.  
 
Table 24. COA breakdown for base year 2021 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2021 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status 
quo.  
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Table 25. COA breakdown for base year 2022 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2022 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status 
quo.  
 
Table 26. COA breakdown for base year 2023 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2023 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status 
quo.  
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Table 27. Table of net present values for COA 1 
 
This table shows the present values of costs associated with COA 1 for NAS Fallon, NV as well as the established discount factor over the 
expected life of the program. We used a discount factor of 7% times the present value of costs for each year. Table referenced in Table 2 of 
chapter V. Results. 
Table 28. Table of net present values for COA 2 
 
This table shows the present values of costs associated with COA 2 for NAS Fallon, NV as well as the established discount factor over the 
expected life of the program. We used a discount factor of 7% times the present value of costs for each year. Table referenced in Table 4 of 
chapter V. Results. 
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Table 29. Table of net present values for COA 3 
 
 
This table shows the present values of benefits associated with COA 3 for NAS Fallon, NV as well as the established discount factor over the 
expected life of the program. We used a discount factor of 7% times the present value of benefits for each year. Table referenced in Table 6 
of chapter V. Results.
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Table 30. Estimated annual contracting costs. Adapted from Goucher and 
Dunlap (2019). 
The study conducted by Goucher and Dunlap (PMA 226) depicts variable and fixed costs as well 
as other costs associated with a fully contractor run SAR program to help determine costs 
associated with COA 3 for NAS Fallon, NV.  
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Table 31. Active duty personnel costs. Adapted from Christensen and 
Sciberras (2019). 
 
This table incorporates active duty base pay, basic allowance for housing, sustenance, and cost of 
living expenses to calculate a total personnel pay expense associated with the number of enlisted 
and officer personnel at NAS Fallon, NV.  
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Table 32. Existing CFT maintenance contract snapshot. Source: Frank 
Nelson, personal communication, June 2019) 
 
Maintenance contract data used to determine existing maintenance contract costs at NAS Fallon, 
NV incorporated into calculations for COA 1 and COA 2.  
 
Table 33. Flight costs for fiscal year 2017–2018. Adapted from Christensen 
and Sciberras (2019). 
 
Data used to determine fuel costs based on total annual average flight hours, fuel burn rate, and 
AVDLR/AFM cost per hour for the MH-60 variant helicopter at NAS Fallon, NV.  
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APPENDIX C. NAS PATUXENT RIVER, MD 
The information contained in this appendix was used for calculations that assisted 
in the development of our COAs for NAS Patuxent River, MD.  
Table 34. General information for NAS Patuxent River 
 
 
Snapshot of general information used in calculations for NAS Patuxent River, MD. These values 
represent data that was used in the determination of individual COA costs for this site location as 
well as fuel burn rates determined for COTs aircraft.  This table is a summary of  calculations 
derived in Appendix C.
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Table 35. COA breakdown for base year 2018 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2018 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status quo. COA 1 
of this table was used in Table 7, 9, and 11 chapter V. Results. 
 
Table 36. COA breakdown for base year 2019 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2019 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status quo.  
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Table 37. COA breakdown for base year 2020 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2020 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status quo.  
 
Table 38. COA breakdown for base year 2021 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2021 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status quo.  
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Table 39. COA breakdown for base year 2022 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2022 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status quo.  
 
Table 40. COA breakdown for base year 2023 
 
Data depicts total cost determinations in base year 2023 for each COA as well as the overall difference in cost from the established status quo.  
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Table 41. Table of net present values for COA 1 
 
This table shows the present values of costs associated with COA 1 for NAS Patuxent River, MD as well as the established discount factor over the 




Table 42. Table of net present values for COA 2 
 
This table shows the present values of costs associated with COA 2 for NAS Patuxent River, MD as well as the established discount factor over the 




Table 43. Table of net present values for COA 3 
 
 
This table shows the present values of benefits associated with COA 3 for NAS Patuxent River, MD as well as the established discount factor over the 
expected life of the program. We used a discount factor of 7% times the present value of benefits for each year. Table referenced in Table 12 of chapter 
V. Results. 
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Table 44. Estimated annual contracting costs. Adapted from Goucher and 
Dunlap (2019). 
 
The study conducted by Goucher and Dunlap (PMA 226) depicts variable and fixed costs as well 
as other costs associated with a fully contractor run SAR program to help determine costs 
associated with COA 3 for NAS Patuxent River, MD.  
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Table 45. Active duty personnel costs. Adapted from Christensen and 
Sciberras (2019). 
This table incorporates active duty base pay, basic allowance for housing, sustenance, and cost of 
living expenses to calculate a total personnel pay expense associated with the number of enlisted 
and officer personnel at NAS Patuxent River, MD.  
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Table 46. Existing CFT maintenance contract snapshot. 
Source: Naval Air Warfare Center (n.d.). 
Maintenance contract data used to determine existing maintenance contract costs at NAS 
Patuxent River, MD incorporated into calculations for COA 1 and COA 2.  
Table 47. Flight costs for fiscal year 2017–2018. 
Adapted from Christensen and Sciberras (2019). 
Data used to determine fuel costs based on total annual average flight hours, fuel burn rate, and 
AVDLR/AFM cost per hour for the MH-60 variant helicopter at NAS Patuxent River, MD.  
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